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Whilst the Korea Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA) may be 
hailed as one of the strongest and most complementary economic 
agreements of its time, there are some anomalies when one 
examines Australia and South Korea’s motivations behind forming the 
agreement. The corresponding proliferation of regional FTAs has 
thus far been understood to result from two broad motivations: a 
desire to advance trade liberalisation beyond World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) disciplines for economic gains; and/or the use of 
FTAs to improve resource and/or territorial security. This paper 
seeks to use the example of the Korea Australian Free Trade 
Agreement (KAFTA) to further the rationalist argument made by 
Mansfield and Milner (2012) that democratic leaders also use the 
formation of such trade agreements for domestic political gain.  
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I.1 Research Question 
The goal of this paper is to explain the disparities in the data when 
one examines the Korea Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA), 
along with the Australian domestic political motivations behind 
forming this agreement. Firstly, this dissertation analyses the 
previous literature on the benefits of free trade and the subsequent 
motivations behind forming free trade agreements. Whilst the KAFTA 
was said to be formed with purely economic motivations, when one 
analyses the trade before and after the KAFTA, it can be seen to 
have had resulted in no significant improvement of trade for Australia 
until very recently. Furthermore, through the analysis of Australian 
public sentiment of South Korea when compared to Japan and China, 
it can be established that Australia views Japan and China as a more 
attractive trading partner than South Korea.  
However, when one analyses the dates the KAFTA was 
negotiated, ratified and implemented with the subsequent 
corresponding dates of the JAEPA and the ChAFTA, it can be seen 
that the KAFTA was negotiated, ratified and implemented faster and 
seemingly with much more ease than the JAPEA and the ChAFTA, 
despite Japan and China being of more importance economically and 
strategically to Australia than South Korea. With the KAFTA not 
significantly improving Australian trade benefits, and Australia 
forming the KAFTA before other strategic FTAs, this poses the 
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question: why did Australia form the KAFTA?  
This thesis aims to explore the possibility that the KAFTA 
was used by Australia to provide a catalyst for forming an FTA with 
Japan and China in order to gain political advantage along with 
recognition and support at home for the Liberal National Coalition 
Government (LNP) in office. Despite each individual trade agreement 
not having a significant positive economic influence on trade, when 
one looks at the potential domestic political benefits the government 
gained from ratifying and implementing three free trade agreements 
within the space of a year, their motivations for forming these 
agreements are illuminated. 
Secondly, to consolidate the rationalist theory made by 
Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner (2012) with the unique cases of 
the KAFTA, JAEPA and the ChAFTA, along with the additional 
concept of catalyst motivations proposed in this thesis, this 
dissertations questions that if Japan and China are of more important 
to Australia than South Korea, why was the KAFTA formed before 
the JAEPA and the ChAFTA? This is the question that is proposed to 
be answered by Mansfield and Milner’s theorem.  
From this question, this dissertation theorises the domestic 
motivations for forming the JAEPA and ChAFTA after the KAFTA 
were the KAFTA was easy to negotiate and ratify due to South 
Korea’s relatively lower level of economic importance to Australia 
than Japan or China, and was therefore used as a catalyst to 
encourage Japan and China to form an FTA with Australia for further 
domestic political benefits. To consolidate this theorisation, deep 
interview analysis was conducted with professionals in the field and 
is presented in the later sections of this paper. The findings of these 
interviews is that despite interviewees attempting to be diplomatic in 
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their assessment of the issue, after being presented with the KAFTA 
timeline facts in comparison to the JAEPA and the ChAFTA, 
discussion and sentiment turned to supporting the concept of a 
catalyst for domestic political benefit. When further presented with 
hypothetical scenarios of no JAEPA or ChAFTA, the importance of 
the KAFTA decreased significantly. 
In conclusion, the goal of this paper is to explain why the 
KAFTA was formed before and negotiated with significant ease when 
compared to the JAEPA and the ChAFTA. This is taking into 
consideration the findings of the paper that sentiment suggests Japan 
and China are of more importance to Australia than South Korea. To 
address this anomaly, this dissertation draws on the works of 
Mansfield and Milner to theorise that other than transparent 
economic motivations to enter into an international economic 
agreement, there are significant domestic political motivations at play. 
Free trade agreements have been the topic of debate for hundreds of 
years in the field of economics due to differing opinions on their 
economic impacts. These debates have given rise to a significant 
amount of literature on the economic and political implications of 
FTAs. However, there is surprisingly little research analysing the 
motivating factors behind forming these agreements. The purpose of 
this paper is to improve our understanding of the motivations behind 
forming free trade agreements. In doing so, this study will also 
contribute to the larger literature on the sources of international 





1.2 Argument and Method 
 
This dissertation aims to explain why the KAFTA was negotiated 
within a shorter timeframe, then ratified and implemented before the 
JAEPA and the ChAFTA, despite the significance of Japan and China 
to Australia both politically and economically. This paper suggests 
this empirical question cannot be solved by the arguments made by 
the existing literature on the KAFTA or FTAs as a whole. Instead, 
this dissertation argues that rather than the previously understood 
economic motivations behind forming FTAs, there are additional 
motivations such as providing a catalyst for an FTA, as is shown 
through Australia’s motivations to form the KAFTA to provide a 
catalyst for the JAEPA and the ChAFTA in order to gain domestic 
political advantage. 
To examine these motivations, which can be considered not 
sincere but more strategic motivations, one must employ deep 
interview analysis, along with intensive analysis of public sentiment 
of the KAFTA, the JAEPA, the ChAFTA, and the political party 
responsible for completing these three FTAs in Australia through 
media printed at that time. This analysis will be theoretically 
consolidated by the hypotheses presented by Edward Mansfield and 
Helen Milner in their book Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy 
of International Trade Agreements.  
Through the presentation and examination of these two forms 
of analysis, not only will there be a representation of professionals in 
the field, the sentiment in Australia at the time presented through 
media analysis will give some indication to the perceived success of 
the government at the time through the eyes of the Australian public, 
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and therefore their motivations for striving to receive this positive 
sentiment. However, the true motivations of the Liberal National 
Coalition Government at the time cannot be fully gleaned through 
interview analysis and media analysis due to the tendency of this 
data to be biased. Whilst this analysis is insufficient, these methods 
can still provide necessary information for understanding the 
domestic motivations behind forming the KAFTA. 
Appendix 1 shows a list of people contacted for interviews 
and survey completion requests. All contacts have been collected 
over a period of two years and are all acquaintances met at 
Australia-South Korea related events. This was the intended list of 
interview and survey participants, but due to the scheduling, only 
five of the thirty-five participants were able to be interviewed (refer 
to Table I-1 below), and a subsequent twenty-five of the intended 
thirty-five were able to complete the survey (refer to Figures I-1 
and I-2 below). Figure I-1 and Figure I-2 both show the 
demographic of survey participants. Out of 25 responses, Australian 
Federal, State and Local Governments made up 29 percent of the 
participants, with 24 percent stating other, and 1 percent choosing 
not to specify. Unfortunately, there were no respondents from 
Korean federal or local government sectors, but this was made up by 
the 40 percent of respondents from the private sector, the majority 
of which worked for Korean companies.1 
 
 
                                            
1 Further information regarding the names, positions and specific companies 
of each participant who were willing to provide such information can be 





<Figure I-1> Demographic of Survey Participants I 
 
<Figure I-2> Demographic of Survey Participants II 
 
For an extensive analysis of the topic, these interview and 
survey responses are certainly insufficient. However, they can 
provide necessary information for the understanding of the domestic 
political motivations behind the KAFTA. Given the position of some 
of the interviewees in terms of South Korean-Australian relations, 
some were willing to give their name, company and position. A 
number of the interviewees agreed to participate, but in order to 
provide a truthful opinion, they believed it was in their best interests 
to be anonymous when quoted throughout this dissertation. In 
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respecting this, they are further referred to throughout this thesis as 
Interviewee 1, Interviewee 2, Interviewee 3, Interviewee 4 and 
Interviewee 5, in no particular order. A list of the interviewees are 
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<Table I-1> Information of Interviewees 
 
Considering Australia’s aforementioned bilateral relationships 
with South Korea, Japan and China, and the respective KAFTA, 
JAEPA, and ChAFTA, this paper seeks to validify Mansfield and 
Milner’s theory that domestic political motivations play a significant 
role in forming free trade agreements. In the case of the KAFTA, 
                                            
2 For further information on the interviews conducted, refer to Appendix 2. 
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JAEPA and ChAFTA, this paper further suggests that the KAFTA 
was used as a catalyst to form the JAEPA and the ChAFTA in order 
for the Liberal National Coalition Government at the time to improve 
their domestic image as a stable political party worthy of re-election 
in the at-the-time upcoming federal election. These hypotheses have 
been tested with deep interview analysis, along with further analysis 






II. Literature Review 
 
Whilst undertaking the required background research for this thesis, 
it became evident that the KAFTA was significantly under 
researched. Of the few relevant scholarly articles focused on 
studying the KAFTA, all are focused on the trade between Australia 
and South Korea, along with their individual trade competitiveness. 
Scholarship on the KAFTA is yet to question the other issues 
surrounding the agreement, which inspired a desire to understand 
and explain these issues for this dissertation. In that sense, this 
paper is unique as it touches on a new area of examination which 
most research and academic studies on the KAFTA have not focused 
on. 
 Kwesi Atuaful Quansah and Woo Chul Ahn analysed the effect 
of the KAFTA on the trade structure between Korea and Australia 
(2012-2015) in their paper The Effect of the Korea-Australia Free 
Trade Agreement (KAFTA) on the Korea-Australia Trade Structure. 
In their piece, which was primarily trade focused, they employed the 
TSI, GL/IIT and CTB indexes to analyse the items traded between 
South Korea and Australia during the period between 2012-15, and 
thereafter. The findings of their paper showed a positive effect of the 
KAFTA, taking into consideration increasing trade between the two 
countries and Australia securing a competitive position in South 
Korea.3  This literature highlighted that the implementation of the 
                                            
3 Kwesi Atuaful Quansah and Woo Chul Ahn, The Effect of the Korea-
Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA) on the Korea-Australia Trade 
Structure, (The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics, 2017), 229. 
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KAFTA is aiding industries and traded items to contribute positively 
to the trade balance of South Korea and Australia, thereby boosting 
trade between the two countries and with the rest of the world.4 
Despite this piece providing imperative analysis of the trade 
relationship between South Korea and Australia, it does not shed any 
light on the questions asked throughout this paper. 
 In Chungwon Choi’s paper Bilateral Trade Agreement 
Between Korea and Australia as an Approach for the Expansion of 
Asia-Pacific Cooperation, they attempt to show whether the bilateral 
agreement between South Korea and Australia would promote the 
effectiveness and cohesion of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC).5 They discuss the limit of the Asia-Pacific cooperation, with 
a link to whether this subregional trade agreement (KAFTA) is 
complementary of the multinational agreement (APEC) or not. They 
further examine the KAFTA through conclusions drawn through 
applying the theoretical model made within the study to search for 
the opportunities for trade liberalisation and economic cooperation 
between South Korea and Australia. This paper is useful in its 
analysis of not just trade relations between Australia and South 
Korea, but how they affect the Asia-Pacific region. However, little 
comparative analysis is made with other FTAs in the region.   
Due to the lack of information on the topic, necessary data and 
information for this thesis was mainly collected from secondary 
government sources. These included the Australian Department of 
                                            
4 Kwesi Atuaful Quansah and Woo Chul Ahn, The Effect of the Korea-
Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA) on the Korea-Australia Trade 
Structure, (The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics, 2017), 229. 
5 Chungwon Choi, Bilateral Trade Agreement between Korea and Australia 




Foreign Affairs and Trade website (DFAT),6 the Austrade website, 
and the South Korean Free Trade Agreement information website.7 
Due to the nature of government websites, it was assumed that the 
data gathered from these sources was of the highest credibility, 
despite some of the wording about South Korea-Australia relations 
tending to be diplomatically biased. However, as these sites are 
government sites, they lack any form of critical reflection in 
reference to the limitations of the KAFTA and policy making 
surrounding the KAFTA. 
To further understand and identify the strategic motivations 
behind the negotiation and implementation of the KAFTA, an 
understanding of free trade agreements as a whole was needed. A 
key piece for understanding FTAs was Robert McMahon’s article The 
Rise in Bilateral Free Trade Agreements. 8  Whilst this piece was 
primarily focused on the American perspective, it provided an 
important perspective to the reality that FTAs are primarily 
examined from either an economic perspective, a security 
perspective, or a mixture of both. This seemed non-representative 
of the free trade agreements examined to that point and spurred 
further research into these two types of FTA motivations. 
The previous literature is primarily concerned with examining 
the economic or security reasons that would motivate a state to form 
an FTA with another state. Firstly, in terms of literature examining 
                                            
6 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia's Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs), (2019), 
https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/Pages/trade-agreements.aspx 
[Accessed 2 Jan. 2019]. 
7 South Korea Free Trade Agreement 강국, 한-호주 자유무역협정 (FTA) 
발효, (2019), http://www.fta.go.kr/main/situation/kfta/lov5/au/ [Accessed 8 
Apr. 2019]. 
8 Robert McMahon, The Rise in Bilateral Free Trade Agreements, (2006). 
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the economic motivations behind forming FTAs, there is Dan Wei, 
Shenhua Chen and Adam Rose’s article Estimating Economic Impacts 
of the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement.9 In this article they 
analyse the economic impacts of the KORUS FTA by applying the 
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) computable general 
equilibrium model to highly disaggregate commodity flow data. Whilst 
this literature was helpful in gaining necessary information about the 
KORUS FTA, it was solely focused on the KORUS FTA as an event 
mutually exclusive from all other events.  
Secondly, the research article titled The Economic Impacts of 
the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement – A General Equilibrium 
Analysis10 by Chaoying Qi and James Xiaohe Zhang also contributes 
to the literature providing an understanding on the economic 
motivations behind the formation of FTAs. This paper attempts to 
examine both the causes and consequences of the delayed 
conclusion of the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA) 
by running simulation experiments on a computable general 
equilibrium model, to see how this free trade agreement affects the 
world economy not only on the two countries involved, but also on 
the rest of the world. Whilst this paper is interesting in that it 
primarily examines the consequences of the ChAFTA, it is still 
focused on economic motivations and subsequent consequences, 
rather than any other potential motivations behind forming these 
agreements.  
                                            
9 Dan Wei, Zhenhua Chen and Adam Rose, Estimating Economic Impacts of 
the US-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (Economic Systems Research, 
2018), 2-4. 
10 Chaoying Qi and James Xiaohe Zhang, The Economic Impacts of the 
China-Australia Free Trade Agreement - A General Equilibrium Analysis, 
(China Economic Review, 2018), 1-4. 
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It became clear that in order to understand the potential 
domestic motivations behind forming free trade agreements, one 
would have to delve deeper into the literature of international 
economics. Commonly recognised as the grandfather of free trade 
literature by scholars such as Irwin11 and Gomes12 is Adam Smith, 
with particular reference to his ground-breaking book An Inquiry into 
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, otherwise known 
simply as The Wealth of Nations (1776). Of all the literature on the 
topic of free trade, Smith is arguably one of the most influential, and 
responsible for launching the new science of political economy. 
Professor Bloomfield reviewed Smith’s work as, “Smith showed 
profound insights as to the underlying basis and gains of trade. He 
analysed in greater detail than any of his predecessors the nature 
and benefits of international specialisation and the factors affecting 
them.”13  
These classic insights into the nature of economic exchanges 
being refined, along with the empirical evidence gathered over the 
past few decades by economists, both contributed to the 
understanding required for this thesis of the advantages of free trade 
and the motivations behind it. Smith further argued that free 
competitive markets would direct the employment of capital and 
enterprise to those trades and industries where they were likely to 
be most productive. This would ensure the maximum level of 
economic welfare and promote social harmony. Smith’s book was 
                                            
11 Douglas Irwin, Free Trade Under Fire, (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2005), 5, 25-27. 
12 Leonard Gomes, The Economics and Ideology of Free Trade: A Historical 
Review, (Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2003) 
2-6. 
13 Arthur Bloomfield, Adam Smith and the Theory of International Trade, 
(Oxford University Press 1975), 481. 
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essential in understanding the classic insights made into the 
motivations behind states forming free trade agreements and lead to 
further related readings. 
One of these such readings was the book by a successful 
London stockbroker by the name of David Ricardo titled On the 
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, 14  which furthered 
Adam Smith’s ideas through his theory that became known as the 
theory of comparative advantage.15 The combination of this book, 
along with his book Works 16  gave a significant background 
understanding of the theories surrounding the motivations behind 
forming free trade agreements in the field of economics. 
To translate this to the field of political science and 
international relations, a relevant book that studied the domestic 
motivations behind forming free trade agreements was sought out, 
and subsequently found in Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner’s 
Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade 
Agreements. 17  As stated by Mansfield and Milner, “Despite the 
importance of FTAs to the international trading system, we lack an 
adequate understanding of why and when governments choose to 
enter these institutions.”18 Mansfield and Milner argue that certain 
                                            
14 David Ricardo and George James Dover, On the Principles of Political 
Economy and Taxation, (London: John Murray, 1819). 
15 Critics of free trade often insist that the theory of comparative advantage 
is obsolete because Ricardo did not consider capital mobility or 
technological transfer between countries. But modern economists have 
altered many of the assumptions underlying Ricardo’s analysis, and the main 
result (that international exchange is mutually advantageous) remains intact. 
For more of this analysis, refer to Irwin, Free Trade Under Fire. 
16 David Ricardo and John Ramsay McCulloch, The Works of David Ricardo, 
(London: J. Murray, 1846), 145. 
17  Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner, Votes, Vetoes, and the Political 
Economy of International Trade Agreements, (Princeton University Press, 
2012). 
18  Mansfield and Milner, Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of 
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domestic political factors exert a strong impact on trade cooperation, 
further influencing international agreements.  
Trade and international trade agreements often stimulate 
domestic interest and opposition due to trade being a critically 
important factor contributing to many countries’ economies. Trade 
agreements can prompt significant domestic support or turmoil, 
depending on the proposed domestic benefits or fallbacks of the 
planned agreement. As such, governments may decide to conclude 
trade agreements in part because they provide domestic political 
benefits. Mansfield and Milner believe leaders trade off the 
constraining aspect of trade agreements in order to improve their 
domestic political fortunes. 19  This book was critical for the 
understanding and support of the argument made in this dissertation 
about the domestic political motivations behind forming the KAFTA, 
the JAEPA and the ChAFTA. 
 In sum, the existing research on the relationship between 
Australia and South Korea is mainly focused on the bilateral trade 
relations with respect to the KAFTA. Furthermore, research with 
regards to FTAs as a whole are solely focused on economic 
motivations for negotiating and entering into FTAs. However, this 
thesis argues that in the case of the KAFTA, these motivations are 
not representative of the full picture, and instead Mansfield and 
Milner’s theory of domestic political motivations along with this 
thesis’ addition of catalyst motivations better explain Australia’s case.  
The findings of the previous literature on both the KAFTA and 
FTAs as a whole imply that there is still much yet to be researched 
                                                                                                               
International Trade Agreements, 5.  
19  Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner, Votes, Vetoes, and the Political 




on this topic. This dissertation aims to overcome the aforementioned 
limitations presented in the previous literature, which focus primarily 
on trade relations between South Korea and Australia, with little 
trade analysis or comparative analysis with other FTAs of its kind. 
For one, this dissertation not only analyses the trade relations 
between South Korea and Australia, it comparatively analyses this 
and the outcomes of the KAFTA with the JAEPA and the ChAFTA. 
The hypotheses presented after this analysis are corroborated with 
in-depth interview analysis and media analysis, along with a realist 
explanation from Mansfield and Milner’s works. The lack of previous 
literature on this particular topic only highlights the significance of 
this piece and need for one of this kind in order to not only 
contribute to the academic field, but to potentially encourage future 
pieces on this topic. However, the few primary pieces available on 
the KAFTA listed above certainly served as a valuable foundation for 








III. Empirical Analysis of Free 
Trade  
Growing world trade has helped lift standards of living and 
relationships between states around the world. The literature on free 
trade has increased in tandem with the effects of free trade and free 
trade agreements with trade policy also remaining a highly 
controversial topic. Ever since Adam Smith and David Ricardo 
studied and described the gains for trade in a particularly organised 
way, economists have stressed that the higher income that results 
from improved resource allocation is the main advantage of trade. 
However, economists have found increased evidence inclined 
towards trade not only helping to allocate existing resources 
properly, but also making those resources more productive. These 
productivity gains from trade also appear to be significant.20 
The benefits of free trade have been analysed and praised for 
centuries by economists. However, of all the literature on the topic 
of free trade, arguably one of the most influential and responsible for 
launching the new science of political economy is Adam Smith’s 
Wealth of Nations (1776). As was argued by Adam Smith, “All 
commerce that is carried on betwixt any two countries must 
                                            
20 Douglas Irwin, Free Trade Under Fire, (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2005), 28-30. 
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necessarily be advantageous to both.” 21  Classic insights into the 
nature of economic exchanges being refined, along with the empirical 
evidence gathered over the past few decades by economists, have 
both contributed to our understanding of the advantages of free trade 
and the motivations behind it. Smith further argued that free 
competitive markets would direct the employment of capital and 
enterprise to those trades and industries where they were likely to 
be most productive. This would ensure the maximum level of 
economic welfare and promote social harmony. 
The traditional case for free trade is based on the concept of 
gains from specialisation and exchange. This refers to countries who 
specialise in one or a few products to export, with which they will 
exchange with products in which their country is lacking, otherwise 
known as imports. This is because most countries do not produce for 
themselves even a fraction of the goods they require. This division 
of labour enables countries to increase their consumption and enjoy 
higher real incomes beyond that which would be possible if they 
attempted to be self-sufficient and produce everything for 
themselves. Specialisation further allows these countries to enjoy a 
much higher standard of living than otherwise and gives them access 
to a greater variety of goods and services. The clear reasons behind 
why a country would want to engage in free trade are stated by 
Adam Smith,  
 
“What is prudence in the conduct of every family can scarce be 
folly in that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can supply us 
with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better 
                                            
21 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations. (London, 1971), 511. 
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buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, 
employed in a way in which we have some advantage. The 
general industry of the country... will not thereby be diminished... 
but only left to find out the way in which it can be employed with 
the greatest advantage, when it is thus directed towards an object 
which is can buy cheaper than it can make.”22  
 
Free trade enables countries, particularly smaller countries, to 
extend the effective size of their market, achieve a more refined 
division of labour, and reap a higher real income than they would if 
international exchange were limited by the governments of these 
countries through short-sighted policies. 
Adam Smith’s work was analysed and further complimented by 
a successful London stockbroker by the name of David Ricardo, who 
developed a theory that came to be known as comparative advantage. 
Comparative advantage implies that a country could find it 
advantageous to import some goods even if it could produce those 
same goods more effectively than other countries. Conversely, a 
country would be able to export some goods even if other countries 
could produce them more efficiently. Ricardo believed that 
international economic relations based on the observance of the law 
of comparative costs,  
 
“... Binds together, by one common tie of interest and 
intercourse, the universal society of nations through the 
civilised world. It is this principle which determines that wine 
shall be made in France and Portugal, that corn shall be grown 
                                            
22 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations. (London, 1971), 456-7. 
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in America and Poland, and that hardware and other goods 
shall be manufactures in England.”23 
 
John Stuart Mill went on to describe the gains of trade in much 
greater detail in his book Principles of Political Economy.24 Here he 
pointed to three main principal gains from trade. Firstly, there are 
the standard gains that arise from specialisation, as described by 
Smith and Ricardo, which was referred to by Mill as “direct economic 
advantages.”  
Secondly, there are the “indirect effects” of trade, which Mill 
states, “... Must be counted as benefits of a high order.”25 This is 
where trade improves economic performance not only by allocating a 
country’s resources to their most efficient use, but by making those 
resources more productive in what they are doing. These indirect 
efforts include,  
 
“... The tendency of every extension of the market to 
improve the processes of production. A country which 
produces for a larger market than its own can introduce a 
more extended division of labour, can make greater use of 
machinery, and is more likely to make inventions and 
improvements in the processes of production.”26  
 
Lastly, Mill argued that, “... Economic benefits of commerce 
are surpassed in importance by those of its effects which are 
                                            
23 David Ricardo and John Ramsay McCulloch, The Works of David Ricardo, 
(London: J. Murray, 1846), 145. 
24 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, (London: John W. Parker, 
1848). 
25 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 389. 
26 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 226. 
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intellectual and moral.”27 Many scholars believe this is a reference to 
Montesquieu’s observation that “commerce is a cure for the most 
destructive prejudices; for it is almost a general rule, that wherever 
we find agreeable manners, there commerce flourishes; and that 
wherever there is commerce, there we meet with agreeable 
manners.”28 In other words, this is where trade brings people into 
contact with one another and subsequently breaks down the narrow 
prejudices that come with insularity. 
A further factor said to influence the fulfilment of national 
ambitions in the sphere of international economic relations has been 
the limitations to the attainment of military and diplomatic objectives 
set by small armies, diplomatic conventions and weak 
administrations.29 Gomes argues that no one state is able to exercise 
a permanent hegemony because power is evenly distributed in many 
ways across the international system and all states suffer to a lesser 
or greater degree from the same weaknesses. Thus, foreign trade is 
the main area of competition and conflict, and international relations 
are primarily defined by economic relations. This ties into the idea 
that economic relations affect security needs met by states as well.  
Thus far, trade has been primarily analysed by the field of 
economics, and motivations behind forming international trade 
agreements are subsequently argued to be primarily economic 
motivations. With the help of Mansfield and Milner’s work, this 
dissertation furthers the argument that there are other, domestic 
political motivations behind forming free trade agreements.  
                                            
27 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 119. 
28 Charles De Secondat Montesquieu, Jean Le Rond D’Alembert and Thomas 
Nugent, The Spirit of Laws, (T.C. Hansard, 1823), 346. 
29 Leonard Gomes, The Economics and Ideology of Free Trade: A Historical 
Review, (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2003). 
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IV. KAFTA for Australia (Catalyst) 
 
IV.1 What is the KAFTA? 
Korea and Australia have always had a history of strong trade; this 
relationship was further strengthened on December 12, 2014 with the 
ratification and implementation of the Korea-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement (KAFTA). The aim of the KAFTA was to remove certain 
barriers to trade and investment in order to make doing business 
between the two countries easier.30 For Australia, as stated by the 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Australia… is 
expected to supply stable resources through strengthening of 
resource cooperation through FTA and expansion of investment 
stability.”31 From Korea’s perspective, the KAFTA was expected to 
supply stable resources through the strengthening of cooperation and 
expansion of investment stability.32 The agreement was considered 
to be mutually beneficial, as the KAFTA committed to protect and 
enhance investments in both directions. 
Australia and South Korea are considered to be natural 
partners due to their many similarities, as they are both democracies 
                                            
30 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia's Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs), (2019), 
https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/Pages/trade-agreements.aspx 
[Accessed 2 Jan. 2019]. 
31 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia's Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs). 
32 South Korea Free Trade Agreement 강국, 한-호주 자유무역협정 (FTA) 




with complementary economies and common strategic interests. The 
relationship between Australia and South Korea has been a strong 
one since Australia’s involvement during the Korean War, 33  after 
which Australia and South Korea established full diplomatic relations 
in 1961. However, this relationship has significantly grown as of late, 
so much so that the two countries have become strong economic, 
political and strategic partners. This can be attributed in-part to the 
remarkable economic progress South Korea has made since the end 
of the Korean War. 
South Korea is currently Australia’s fourth largest trading 
partner, an economic partnership that was strengthened after the 
signing of the KAFTA. Two-way goods and services trade were 
worth approximately $52.3 billion in 2017-18.34 Trade volumes are 
expected to normalise throughout the course of this year (2019). 
This complementary trade relationship between Australia and South 
Korea includes South Korea importing Australian goods such as 
minerals, energy and travel and education services, and Australia 
                                            
33 For a more comprehensive overview of the Korean War and Korean 
political history since the Korean War, refer to Australia’s Republic of Korea 
country brief. According to the information from this site, the Australia-ROK 
relationship was strengthened by Australia’s participation in the United 
Nations (UN) Commissions on Korea (beginning in 1947) and in the Korean 
War (1950-53). Approximately 17,000 Australian troops served under UN 
command (1950-56) and 340 Australians died during the Korean War. 
Following the end of hostilities in 1953, Australia became a member of the 
United Nations Committee for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, a 
position held until the dissolution of the Committee in 1973. The Australian 
effort in this war is arguably what started the relationship between South 
Korea and Australia. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of 
Korea Country Brief, (2019). https://dfat.gov.au/geo/republic-of-
korea/pages/republic-of-korea-south-korea-country-brief.aspx [Accessed 
5 Jan. 2019]. 
34 Unit: $AUD. This number was representative of 6.6 percent of all 
Australia’s international trade throughout 2017 to 2018. Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea Country Brief. 
 
 ２４
importing such South Korean goods as passenger vehicles, petroleum, 
and electronic goods and parts. 35  The KAFTA is one of both 
Australia’s and South Korea’s most comprehensive trade agreements, 
claiming to deliver, “… Significant improvements in market access 
and tariff liberalisation for merchandise trade.”36 
Further trade and investment links, along with people-to-
people and institutional links, are improving the relationship between 
Australia and South Korea on a daily basis. Cooperation between 
Australia and South Korea has not only strengthened the mutually 
beneficial trade relationship, it has contributed to efforts to 
strengthen the regional security and stability of their mutually 
occupied space, the Asia-Pacific region. 
The economic success and stability of the relationship 
between these two countries is reliant on the stability of the region, 
meaning both countries are not only focused on developing relations 
with one another, they are invested in multiple relationships with 
other countries in the region. Australia has claimed this increased 
focus on improving relations with countries in Asia is an, “… Abiding 
priority in Australian foreign and trade policy”.37 Some institutions 
both countries are active in are the G20, Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), the East Asia Summit (EAS) and MIKTA 
                                            
35 For a more extensive list of the imports and exports of the KAFTA, refer 
to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of 
Korea Country Brief. 
36 For further details regarding the KAFTA, refer to the Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Korea Australia Free 
Trade Agreement (KAFTA) website. The full KAFTA can also be accessed 
on this site. 
37 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Advancing the National 
Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, (Canberra: 
2002), p. xv. 
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(Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia).38 Both countries 
are also considered strong allies of the Unites States.  
Whilst the relationship between the two countries is 
substantial, there is certainly room for growth. An inquiry into 
Australia’s engagement with the Korean peninsula claims, “In 
addition to the already established trade in primary resources, 
energy and manufactured goods, there is potential for expansion in 
areas such as food and entertainment services, automotive parts, 
financial services, tourism and educational services as well as 
collaboration in research and development.” 39  This potential for 
growth between the two countries should be encouragement for 
further growth in the studies undertaken about the relationship 
between South Korea and Australia. 
 
IV.2 Analysis of Economic Effects of the KAFTA, 
JAEPA and ChAFTA 
Australia’s economy is often described as a relatively small but open 
one, “… That has heavily based its economic growth on increasing 
exports, mostly natural resources and agricultural commodities, and 
                                            
38 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea Country 
Brief, (2019). https://dfat.gov.au/geo/republic-of-korea/pages/republic-of-
korea-south-korea-country-brief.aspx [Accessed 5 Jan. 2019]. 
39 For a full comprehensive list of the formal inquiry into Australia’s 
engagement with the Korean peninsula, refer to Parliament of Australia, 
Chapter 1: Australia’s Engagement with the Korean Peninsula – Parliament 
of Australia, (2019), 
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Complete
d_Inquiries/jfadt/korea/chapter1 [Accessed 11 Feb. 2019]. 
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foreign capital.”40 The Abbott government secured three significant 
free trade agreements during 2014 and 2015 with Australia’s first, 
second and fourth largest trading partners – China, Japan and South 
Korea. These countries are all significant destinations for Australia’s 
national resource exports such as coal, iron ores, and copper ores in 
addition to a range of agricultural goods such as beef. Whilst 
economic returns from such trade treaties were the main source of 
justification for their efficacy and viability, there were perhaps other 
domestic political motivational factors at play that should be 
considered. 
If one refers to Table IV-141 , one can see that Australia’s 
interest in bilateral trade agreements started in 1983 with the 
Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (also known as the 
ANZCERTA or CERA). Australia’s interest in bilateral trade 
agreements picked up again in 2003 and has been steady ever since. 
However, the most significant time for the support of bilateral trade 
came in the span of a year between December 2014 and December 
2015, when Australia signed free trade agreements with South Korea, 
Japan and China. 
                                            
40 Mahinda Siriwardana, Australia’s New Free Trade Agreements with Japan 
and South Korea: Potential Economic and Environmental Impacts, (Journal of 
Economic Integration: 2015), 617. 
41 For all corresponding dates and information relating to Free Trade 
Agreements made by Australia, refer to the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, Australia's Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), (2019), 
https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/Pages/trade-agreements.aspx 




FTA Date Implemented 
1 Australia-New Zealand (ANZCERTA or CERA) 1983.01.01 
2 Singapore-Australia (SAFTA) 2003.07.28 
3 Australia-United States (AUSFTA) 2005.01.01 
4 Thailand-Australia (TAFTA) 2005.01.01 
5 Australia-Chile (ACl-FTA) 2009.03.06 
6 ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand (AANZFTA) 2010.01.01 
7 Malaysia-Australia (MAFTA) 2013.01.01 
8 Korea-Australia (KAFTA) 2014.12.12 
9 Japan-Australia (JAEPA) 2015.01.15 
 
10 China-Australia (ChAFTA) 2015.12.20 
11 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) 
2018.12.30 
 




Whilst Australia is often thought of as a trading nation, 
Australia is a relatively small player in terms of its contribution to 
world trade. This is because the country’s lack of land borders 
reduces the amount of local international trade compared with other 
countries. Figure IV-142 shows exports, imports and trade balances 
as a proportion of GDP for a selection of G20 members, including 
South Korea, Japan and China. 
 
 
<Figure IV-1> Exports, Imports and Trade Balance as a Proportion of GDP 
in Select G20 Economies. 
                                            
42 For further economic analysis on Australia’s trade in figures, with 
particular emphasis on Australia’s trade as a share of GDP, refer to the 
Parliament of Australia, Trade in Goods and Services (Indicator), (2019), 
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parli





Nevertheless, Australia’s integration with the world economy 
is growing and remains strong. Table IV-243 shows Australia’s ten 
largest trading partners. 
 
 Goods and Services Total Share (%) 
Exports Imports 
China 123,274 71,346 194,620 35 
Japan 51,328 26,267 77,595 14 
United States 21,424 48,752 70,177 12.7 
South Korea 23,628 28,674 52,303 9.4 
India 21,145 7,971 29,116 5.3 
New Zealand 14,370 13,905 28,275 5.1 
United 
Kingdom 
11,757 16,036 27,793 5 
Singapore 13,164 14,610 27,773 5 
Thailand 6,610 18,078 24,688 4.5 
Germany 4,170 18,185 22,355 4 
Total two-way 
trade (with top 
10) 
290870 263770 554745  
 
<Table IV-2> Australia’s Top 10 Trading Partners (2017-18 AUS $ million) 
 
                                            
43 Information for this table was made through compiling data found from 
source: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia’s Top 10 Two-
Way Trading Partners, (2017-18), 
https://dfat.gov.au/trade/resources/trade-at-a-glance/Pages/default.aspx, 
[Accessed: 2 Feb. 2019]. Interactive maps help with the understanding of 
each trading partner’s trade benefits for Australia. 
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Figure IV-2 44  and Table IV-3 45  show the bilateral trade 
between Australia and South Korea from 2012 to 2018.46 
 
<Figure IV-2> Australia’s Merchandise Trade with South Korea 
 
Year Exports Imports Total Trade 
2013-14 22,668 12,695 35,362 
2014-15 20,613 15,112 35,725 
2015-16 19,971 14,159 34,130 
2016-17 22,761 15,854 38,616 
2017-18 23,628 28,674 52,303 
 
<Table IV-3> Australia’s Goods and Services Trade with South Korea (AUS 
$ Million) 
                                            
44 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
General Information Economic Indicators: Republic of Korea, (Feb. 2019), 
https://dfat.gov.au/trade/resources/Documents/rkor.pdf, [Accessed: 4 Mar. 
2019]. 
45 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia’s Top 10 Two-Way 
Trading Partners, (2017-18), https://dfat.gov.au/trade/resources/trade-at-
a-glance/Pages/default.aspx, [Accessed: 2 Feb. 2019]. 
46 Over this period, a substantial growth in trade seems to have taken place, 
with exports to South Korea remaining relatively steady but imports 
increasing significantly between 2016 and 2018. 
 
 ３１
Figure IV-3 47  and Table IV-4 48  show the bilateral trade 
between Australia and Japan from 2012 to 2018.49 
 
<Figure IV-3> Australia’s Merchandise Trade with Japan 
 
Year Exports Imports Total Trade 
2013-14 50,972 21,276 72,248 
2014-15 46,444 21,291 67,734 
2015-16 37,975 22,577 60,553 
2016-17 44,455 24,064 68,519 
2017-18 51,328 26,267 77,595 
 
<Table IV-4> Australia’s Goods and Services Trade with Japan (AUS 
$ Million) 
                                            
47 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
General Information Economic Indicators: Japan, (Feb. 2019), 
https://dfat.gov.au/trade/resources/Documents/japan.pdf, [Accessed 4 Mar. 
2019]. 
48 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia’s Top 10 Two-Way 
Trading Partners, (2017-18), https://dfat.gov.au/trade/resources/trade-at-
a-glance/Pages/default.aspx, [Accessed: 2 Feb. 2019]. 
49 Exports to Japan have shown a steady growth after a steady increase 




Figure IV-4 50  and Table IV-5 51  show the bilateral trade 
between Australia and China from 2012 to 2018.52 
 
<Figure IV-4> Australia’s Merchandise Trade with China 
 
Year Exports Imports Total Trade 
2013-14 99,986 52,599 152,585 
2014-15 85,070 59,517 144,587 
2015-16 87,829 64,232 152,061 
2016-17 110,012 64,230 174,242 
2017-18 123,274 71,346 194,620 
 
<Table IV-5> Australia’s Goods and Services Trade with China (AUS 
$ Million). Source: Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade 
                                            
50 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
General Information Economic Indicators: China, (Feb. 2019), 
https://dfat.gov.au/trade/resources/Documents/chin.pdf, [Accessed: 4 Mar. 
2019]. 
51 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia’s Top 10 Two-Way 
Trading Partners, (2017-18), https://dfat.gov.au/trade/resources/trade-at-
a-glance/Pages/default.aspx, [Accessed: 2 Feb. 2019]. 
52 After a slight decrease over a couple of years for exports, both imports 




According to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
trade, the purpose of the KAFTA was to put Australian exports and 
exporters at a level to compete with products and producers from 
the United States and the European Union, Australia’s largest export 
competitors. According to the Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics, 
the KAFTA sets Korean tariffs at zero for 84 per cent (by 2013 
import value) of Australian exports on day one of KAFTAs operation, 
rising to 95.7 per cent within 10 years and 99.8 per cent once the 
KAFTA is fully implemented. The KAFTA sets Australian tariffs at 
zero on 86 per cent of Korean exports from day one, rising to 100 
per cent in eight years. By 2033, 99.7% of Australian exports will be 
tariff free, and by 2021, 100% of Korean exports will be tariff free.53  
The Australia-Korea Business Council claims that some tariffs 
will be phased out over time, with others being removed immediately 
after implementation, as was the case. 54  Korean exports include 
motor vehicles and parts, steel products and textiles, white goods, 
chemicals, footwear and clothing, as well as plastics and textiles.55 
Australian exports that have benefited from the KAFTA include beef, 
wheat, dairy, sugar, wine, horticulture, seafood, oil seeds, grapes, 
                                            
53 Kwesi Atuaful Quansah and Woo Chul Ahn, The Effect of the Korea-
Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA) on the Korea-Australia Trade 
Structure, (The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics, 2017), 230. 
54 Although most of the information from this source was itself sourced 
from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, it was still 
useful in its summarisation of many facts. Australia Korea Business Council, 
Korea Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA), (2014-15), 
https://akbc.com.au/korea-australia-free-trade-agreement-kafta/, 
[Accessed: 5 May. 2019]. 
55 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Korea 
Australia Free Trade Agreement, (2019), 
https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/kafta/Pages/korea-australia-
fta.aspx, [Accessed 2 Feb. 2019]. 
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cherries, mangoes and other manufactured goods.56 
In the name of progressive liberalisation and globalisation, 
some Australian industry has been negatively affected by the KAFTA 
through the introduction of competitive Korean products to the 
Australian market, including motor vehicles and parts, steel products 
and textiles, plus footwear and clothing.  
Australian Industry Group’s chief executive, Innes Willox, said 
the agreement would mean 88% of Australian goods would be able to 
be exported to Korea tariff-free post-agreement, but the 
corresponding abolition of Australian tariffs on Korean goods would 
mean an increase in competition for Korean goods in the Australian 
market. This was met with much protest from Australian industry, 
particularly in the affected areas. 57  The agreement has famously 
been dubbed “a cars for cows deal” by the Australian Manufacturing 
Workers’ Union. 58  The Australian Trade and Investment Minister, 
Andrew Robb, claimed the agreement would double Australia’s beef 
exports to Korea by 2030, with many other industries also benefiting 
highly from the agreement.59 
 However, when one examines the tables and figures 
presented above, it can be shown that despite the KAFTA being 
hailed as providing a significant economic advantage to Australia, it 
has not been that way. In fact, bilateral trade between South Korea 
                                            
56 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Korea 
Australia Free Trade Agreement. 
57 Daniel Hurst, Free Trade Deal with South Korea, (2014),  
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/17/free-trade-deal-with-
south-korea-will-help-australian-beef-producers [Accessed 12 Apr. 
2019]. 
58 McRobert, K. (2014). KAFTA ‘cars for cows’ deal questioned. 
59 Daniel Hurst, Free Trade Deal with South Korea, (2014),  
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/17/free-trade-deal-with-




and Australia decreased after the KAFTA was signed and has only 
begun to pick up as of 2018.  
The JAEPA and the ChAFTA, when examined separately, 
have a similarly lacklustre economic impact, despite both of these 
free trade agreements being marketed at the time of their 
negotiations as having the potential to significantly benefit bilateral 
trade. If these free trade agreements were purely made for economic 
purposes, then considering China, Japan and South Korea’s 
respective economic importance to Australia, their respective free 
trade agreements would have been made in that order.  
However, if one refers to Table IV-660, one can notice that 
the free trade agreements made by Australia with these three 
countries were done in reverse order to what would be expected. 
The negotiations were made as expected in order of economic 
importance to Australia, with China FTA negotiations starting in 2005, 
Japan FTA negotiations starting in 2007 and South Korea FTA 
negotiations starting in 2009. However, contrary to this, the order of 
negotiation rounds and end of negotiations from the least and the 
earliest goes from South Korea, then Japan to China, which is the 
exact opposite of their order of economic significance to Australia.  
This leads to the assumption furthered by Mansfield and 
Milner that there must have been other motivations for forming the 
KAFTA, considering the ease of negotiations compared to the more 
significant JAEPA and ChAFTA. In the following section, these 
motivations will be defined as domestic political motivations and will 
be explored through reference to media and interview analysis. 
                                            
60 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia's Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs), (2019), 
https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/Pages/trade-agreements.aspx 





<Table IV-6> Dates of Negotiation, Ratification and Implementation of the 
KAFTA, JAEPA and ChAFTA 
 
IV.3 Domestic Benefits of the KAFTA  
This section of the thesis seeks to shed light on the anomalies 
mentioned throughout the thesis of the KAFTA when compared to 
the JAEPA and the ChAFTA, and how these showcase Australia’s 
domestic political motivations for forming the KAFTA. These 
thoughts are further explained in detail using the works of Mansfield 
and Milner. Firstly, a survey was conducted to solidify the claim that 
Australia was focusing on ratifying free trade agreements with Japan 
and China after the one made with South Korea. As can be seen in 
Figure IV-5, the results from the survey show the sentiment of 
industry professionals that this was the case.  
 Negotiations End of Negotiations 
(Ratification) 
Put into Effect 
KAFTA 2009.05 - 2010.05  
(5 rounds) 
2013.12.05 2014.12.12 
JAEPA 2007.04.24 – 2012.06.15 
(16 rounds) 
2014.07.08 2015.01.15 
ChAFTA 2005.05.23 - 





<Figure IV-5> Predicted Next FTA for Australia 
 
International trade agreements have played an important role 
in the global political economy for hundreds of years, and that role is 
one that is growing exponentially today. Free trade agreements 
(FTAs) are a subgroup of a larger definition of international 
agreements known as a preferential trading area (PTA). The key 
difference between these two is that where PTAs serve to reduce 
tariffs but not completely eliminate them, FTAs aim to eliminate 
tariffs completely over a certain course of time. Mansfield and Milner 
take reference from multiple scholars to summarise the five different 
types of PTAs: 
 
 ３８
1. Preferential agreement (PA), where each participant is 
granted preferential access to particular segments of the 
other members’ markets. Trade barriers on certain 
products are lowered by each member and these 
concessions are not extended to third parties. The initial 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
agreement involving Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand in 1977 was such an accord. It 
was upgraded to an FTA in 1992. 
2. Free trade area (FTA), in which an agreement is made 
where the trade barriers on most (if not all) products 
within the agreement are reduced or completely eliminated. 
Among the most prominent FTAs are the NAFTA and both 
ASEAN (since 1992) and the SADC (since 2000).  
3. Customs unions (CUs), where arrangements are made in 
which members eliminate trade barriers on other 
participants’ goods and impose a common external tariff 
(CET) on imports from third parties. 
4. Common market (CM) is a CU that is augmented by similar 
product regulations and the free flow of factors of 
production among members. 
5. An economic union is a common market whereby members 
also coordinate fiscal and monetary policies.61  
 
Due to the nature of the KAFTA, JAEPA and ChAFTA being 
free trade agreements, this type of PTA will be the focus of 
discussion in this dissertation. Generally, PTAs are all formed with 
                                            
61  Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner, Votes, Vetoes, and the Political 




the same purpose (to trade freely) and the five types listed above 
simply vary in their degrees of integration. Free trade agreements 
(FTAs) are defined by Mansfield and Milner as, “A set of institutions 
that are designed to foster economic integration among member-
states by improving and stabilising each member’s access to other 
participants’ markets” 62  by reducing tariffs with the end goal of 
removing tariffs on certain products all together over a designated 
timeframe.  
Over the past half century, the negotiation and implementation 
of multiple FTAs has increased significantly, with Asia being 
considered as the last frontier, as countries in this region have been 
much slower to sign FTAs when compared to other countries. Free 
trade agreements often regulate many types of trade and many 
aspects of international economic relations, whilst also affecting 
trade in, “… Manufactures, agriculture, and services, as well as 
foreign investment, labour rights, and environmental practises.”63 It 
is generally accepted that FTAs are the dominant method of 
regulating international economic relations outside of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO). As stated by Mansfield and Milner, 
“Despite the importance of FTAs to the international trading system, 
we lack an adequate understanding of why and when governments 
choose to enter these institutions.”64 
Mansfield and Milner argue that certain domestic political 
factors exert a strong impact on trade cooperation, further 
influencing international agreements. Trade and international trade 
                                            
62  Mansfield and Milner, Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of 
International Trade Agreements, 1. 
63  Mansfield and Milner, Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of 
International Trade Agreements, 2. 
64  Mansfield and Milner, Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of 
International Trade Agreements, 4. 
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agreements often stimulate domestic interest and opposition due to 
trade being a critically important factor contributing to many 
countries’ economies. Trade agreements can prompt significant 
domestic support or turmoil, depending on the proposed domestic 
benefits or fallbacks of the planned agreement. As such, 
governments may decide to conclude trade agreements in part 
because they provide domestic political benefits. Mansfield and 
Milner believe leaders trade off the constraining aspect of trade 
agreements in order to improve their domestic political fortunes.65 
Motivations for leaders to sign trade accords are fairly obvious: they 
favour policy that will help them or their party to remain in power. 
Domestic politics further affect why and when states have 
cooperated to form FTAs due to their significance for the politics at 
home. It has therefore been hypothesised by Mansfield and Milner 
that democratic countries are more likely to enter into FTAs than 
nondemocratic regimes. 
In Mansfield and Milner’s (2012) book they develop a 
rationalist theory to explain why governments negotiate PTAs. They 
argue that political leaders focus on how trade agreements can 
reassure the public and domestic groups about their decision making, 
but that they also worry about the domestic costs involved in 
ratifying agreements. Mansfield and Milner argue that balancing 
these two forces is central to a decision maker’s calculations 
regarding whether to sign an FTA. Absent in current literature, they 
argue that regime type and veto players (those groups that can block 
policy change) are two distinct elements of a country’s domestic 
political institutions. Regime type is linked to the degree of political – 
                                            
65  Mansfield and Milner, Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of 
International Trade Agreements, 1-22. 
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especially electoral – competition, while veto players affect the 
checks and balances in the executive branch. 
With specific reference to regime type, and political/electoral 
competition, elections in which leaders can be replaced is the core of 
democracy, and Mansfield and Milner argue that democracies have 
greater reason to enter FTAs than other nondemocratic states. 
Whilst many regimes have elections, not all of these elections entail 
the leader will be removed from office. Mansfield and Milner 
therefore further argue that greater political competition for office in 
democracies could lead to motivating leaders to sign international 
trade agreements to benefit them in these such elections. This is 
because free and fair elections have the greatest influence on the 
behaviours of democratic leaders if the public and interest groups 
care about the policy choices made by these leaders. The degree of 
electoral competition directly affects leaders’ domestic political 
incentives.  
As is hypothesised by Mansfield and Milner, as the fate of a 
government becomes more dependent on free and fair elections, its 
leaders derive increasing gains from FTAs, prompting public officials 
to engage in greater cooperation with other countries on commercial 
issues. Hence, the probability of a country concluding a trade 
agreement rises as its domestic institutions grow more democratic. 
They theorise that,  
 
“The greater electoral constraints faced by democratic heads 
of government influences them to be more cooperative 
internationally than their nondemocratic counterparts. The 
reassurance that FTAs provide to societal groups in 
democracies helps alleviate the concern that some voters and 
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free trade interest groups have about governments yielding 
too much to protectionist demands.”66 
 
The argument is not so much that democratic leaders have a 
greater preference for free trade than leaders in other regimes, but 
that democratic leaders are more likely to join PTAs than other 
governments because electoral competition creates an incentive for 
them to do so. Participating in a trade agreement reassures the 
public and interest groups favouring trade that executives will refrain 
from overprotecting special interests and thereby enhancing the 
leader’s political support. 
Free trade agreements allow leaders to convince voters that 
they are generally abiding by the terms of the international 
agreement and their policies are thus not responsible for any 
economically difficult times. These leaders are therefore more likely 
to be re-elected even during economic downturns. This incentivises 
politicians to enter into more free trade agreements the more 
political competition they have at home due to these FTAs providing 
a sense of reassurance of the policy of the government in power. 
This transparency of information can increase support for political 
leaders, helping them to remain in office. This is desirable, as 
governments generally want to remain in power. 
Veto players affect the formation of FTAs in that as the 
number of veto players increases, so does the likelihood of at least 
one of them affecting the ratification of the FTA. This is costly for 
political leaders, as they either have to ratify the agreement to 
appease these veto players or provide incentives for the veto groups 
                                            
66 Mansfield and Milner, Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of 
International Trade Agreements, 23-69. 
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to accept the agreement. The best course of action is to have an 
agreement with as little veto players or groups opposing it as 
possible. The more there are, the greater the transaction cost is, and 
the less likely leaders are to enter into trade agreements. 
Mansfield and Milner argue that a government should realise 
an increase in political support as a result of signing an FTA. More 
specifically, since FTAs help leaders overcome domestic political 
problems, leaders who sign them should have a longer tenure in 
office than those who do not sign such agreements. This thesis will 
second this argument with a few additions due to the slightly 
different political system of Australia. Rather than leaders 
themselves being re-elected, the party responsible for the 
successful ratification and implementation of an FTA will be 
acknowledged for doing such, and therefore lead to successful 
campaigning for their party and in most cases re-election. 
Governments use the ratification of free trade agreements to 
reassure the populace that they have not mismanaged the economy. 
Therefore, the argument made by Mansfield and Milner is that 
political leaders enter into FTA deals because joining a preferential 
grouping yields domestic political benefits for heads of state that are 
difficult to obtain through unilateral policy measures. 
For a trade agreement to occur from a rationalist perspective, 
governments and certain domestic groups have to find the accord 
which is preferable to the lack of one. To be rational instruments, 
agreements must provide net benefits to some domestic groups in all 
of the participating countries and subsequently provide significant 
economic benefits to the countries involved. Equally, the 
governments involved must decide that the benefits from concluding 
the agreement will exceed the associated costs. A rational 
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government will only cooperate if the expected benefits provided by 
the agreement exceed the costs of negotiating and ratifying it. These 
benefits and costs are argued to be political, rather than the 
commonly perceived economic costs. 
When the interviewees were presented with the hypothetical 
question, actually being the hypothesis of this thesis: “In Australia, 
some argue Australia approached South Korea to form an FTA to get 
the attention of other countries. How truthful do you think this is?” 
The results of the 25 survey respondents are shown in Figure IV-6, 
which shows that as predicted, none of the respondents claimed the 
statement to be true, but the vast majority claimed there was some 
truth to the statement. This shows that the majority of professional 
sentiment on the KAFTA reflects that of the conclusions made in this 
thesis. The answers of each interviewee are discussed further below.  
 
 






Interviewee 1 was able to acknowledge that many Australians 
give more favour towards Japan, China, Japanese products and 
Chinese products as they do not know much about South Korea. 
They believed this has come about after a long and relatively slow 
relationship of building mutual trust and respect. The majority of the 
Australian population all have a basic knowledge of Japanese and 
Chinese culture and language, due to it being taught in most schools, 
with Interviewee 1 further claiming, “Awareness about subsequent 
business with South Korea simply cannot compete.” However, they 
were of the belief this is slowly beginning to change. 
Interviewee 2 claims that in conversations with primary 
producers and their representatives, “There was an aspiration that a 
good outcome in Korea would reassure other Asian nations. Some 
nations, namely Japan, are known not just for their strong economy 
and desirable partnership, but also for their impenetrable culture 
when it comes to forming partnerships.” With the case of Australia-
Japan relations, from the experience of this interviewee, they were 
going slow and steady, but Australia wished they were developing at 
a faster pace, and Australia could have potentially used the Free 
Trade Agreement with South Korea as a prompt for Japan to speed 
relations along. This is further applicable to Australia’s relations with 
China. 
Interviewee 3 agreed with the idea that Australia could have 
been using the Free Trade Agreement with South Korea as a catalyst 
to prompt Japan or China into forming their own FTA with Australia. 
They claimed, “South Korea is not a key strategic market for 
Australian government and businesses, despite our two-way trade 
being the fourth largest out of all trading partners. However, there 
may have been FTA synergy for Australia, at least seemingly from 
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the outside, to enter into FTAs with South Korea, China and Japan. 
Therefore, I support this assertation to some extent.” This 
interviewee, with more experience in Australian domestic politics, 
further claimed there may have been a domestic political intention 
behind this FTA, “The Abbott government at the time was entering 
an election season and the Trade Minister at the time, Andrew Robb 
MP, was about to retire and he may have wanted to ‘seal the deals’ 
under his ministership.” With this in mind, the concept of South Korea 
being used to prompt Japan into signing an FTA would take on a new 
urgency due to the impending time limitations.  
This links directly to the theorisation made by Mansfield and 
Milner that there are domestic political motivations behind countries 
forming free trade agreements. It is interesting to note here that the 
Australian domestic political significance of ratifying the KAFTA, and 
then the JAEPA and the ChAFTA takes on more importance when 
one realises the timeframe they were aiming to end negotiations was 
between the 2013 election and 2016 election.  
Considering Australia’s election system where one party can 
be elected for an indefinite amount of time, with specific reference to 
Mansfield and Milner stating this means the party will have more 
motivation to sign a free trade agreement to prove itself, the 
importance of the KAFTA is further highlighted. As this paper further 
theorises, the KAFTA was used as a catalyst for forming free trade 
agreements with Japan and China as a way of ratifying as many 
significant free trade agreements as possible within a short time 
frame before the election period.  
With reference to Table IV-767, the leading party at the time, 
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the Liberal National Coalition, can be seen to have ratified 8 of the 
11 free trade agreements today. However, at the time of the KAFTA 
negotiations, they were almost even with the opposition party for the 
number of free trade agreements successfully ratified and 
implemented. As can be seen in Table IV-7, not only has the KAFTA, 
JAEPA and ChAFTA solidified the reputation of the Liberal National 
Coalition as the government with the most amount of free trade 
agreements ratified under their guidance, according to Mansfield and 
Milner, this has helped guarantee their success in being re-elected 
(including the recent election of May/June 2019). 
                                                                                                               
https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/Pages/trade-agreements.aspx 




Free Trade Agreement Ratification Date Political Party in Power 
Australia-New Zealand  




2003.07.28 Liberal National 
Australia-United States  
(AUSFTA) 
2005.01.01 Liberal National 
Thailand-Australia 
(TAFTA) 









2013.01.01 Liberal National 
Korea-Australia (KAFTA) 2014.12.12 Liberal National 
Japan-Australia (JAEPA) 2015.01.15 
 
Liberal National 
China-Australia (ChAFTA) 2015.12.20 Liberal National 
Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(CPTPP) 
2018.12.30 Liberal National 
 
<Table IV-7> Australia’s Free Trade Agreements and the Political 
Parties Responsible for their Completion 
 
 This theory can be further solidified when one examines the 
media surrounding the Minister for Trade and Investment at the time 
for the Liberal National Coalition Government, Andrew Robb, along 
with the respective Abbott-led Liberal National Coalition 
Government. Domestically, Andrew Robb became famous for 
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finalising the Free Trade Agreements with South Korea, then Japan 
and China. Media at the time started the phrase “clinched the deal” 
when referring to Andrew Robb, which is a phrase that is still 
associated with his name (i.e. Andrew Robb, the minister who 
clinched the Free Trade Agreement with China/Japan/South Korea). 
He and his deeds are also often referred to as “historic”. Former 
Minister Robb now runs a private consulting business based on 
providing services in trade and investment in the Asia Pacific. The 
business’ web site states, “Until his recent retirement from politics, 
Andrew Robb was Australia’s Minister for Trade and Investment. In 
this role Mr Robb negotiated Free Trade Agreements with South 
Korea, Japan and China.” 68  With regards to the Liberal National 
Coalition, which is the central-right, more conservative party in 
Australian politics, they claim on their website,  
 
“Since 2013, the Coalition Government has pursued the most 
ambitious trade strategy in Australia’s history. The benefits 
of our trade strategy are also demonstrated by the fact that 
Australia has recorded 27 years of uninterrupted economic 
growth. There is no accident or coincidence in this – our 
commitment to free trade and investment has driven 
economic growth.”69  
 
With reference to Mansfield and Milner’s theorisation, 
democratic governments will use free trade agreements to reassure 
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their populace of the party’s economic reliability. Not only did the 
Liberal National Coalition do this through ratifying the KAFTA, and 
arguably using this as a catalyst to ratify the JAEPA and the ChAFTA, 
they are still using this legacy in their policy to continue to be 
elected today. 
However, Interviewee 4 believed, “Due to the limited benefits 
or opportunities to enter the South Korean market offered to certain 
Australian agricultural products not included in the tariff-free section 
of the KAFTA, this sentiment doesn’t make any sense.”  They 
believed it would be illogical for Australia to aimlessly make a Free 
Trade Agreement with South Korea if they did not completely benefit. 
During this section of the interview, a debate ensued about the 
benefits outweighing the losses, and the potential compromises that 
Australia would have had to make if they were potentially looking 
beyond the simple benefits provided by the FTA to the more 
significant potential benefits of another FTA. This interviewee would 
only agree with this statement of Australia’s strategic motivations if 
it were referred to as a “hypothetical situation.” This only further 
accentuates the point made by this thesis that these strategic 
domestic political motivations for Australia were significant, but have 
not been researched due to being deemed insincere and thus taboo.  
Interviewee 5 simply found the statement to be intriguing. 
They claimed that due to their lack of knowledge on Australian trade 
motivations, they could not necessarily speak from Australia’s 
perspective, but from South Korea’s perspective, there is certainly a 
very strong economic rivalry with Japan and China, which has been 
present for many years. The question was then asked of what do 
they think would happen if South Korea was in Japan’s position? As 
in, if Australia was making a free trade agreement with South Korea, 
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which was taking much longer than anticipated, how do they think 
South Korea would react if Australia suddenly completed negotiations 
on a free trade agreement with Japan or China with plans to 
implement it immediately? “I think South Korea would be very 
inclined to meet whatever needs Australia had to get things moving 
and complete the FTA as quickly as possible.” 
When the interviewees were asked what they believed would 
have happened to the KAFTA should Australia have never negotiated 
or shown any interest in negotiating an FTA with Japan or China, 
there seemed to be some confusion. As stated by Interviewee 3, “I 
find it difficult to even think of the idea, considering Japan has just 
always seemed to be number 1 for Australia, if one doesn’t consider 
China. Culturally, Japan is number 1.” Interviewee 2 had more of a 
hypothetical answer to this question, claiming, “If we are moving into 
really hypothetical grounds here, my instant reaction is to say that 
Australia would not have had any interest in South Korea. Because if 
they have no interest in Japan or China, then that would be an 
indication that they would not be interested in that Northern part of 
the Asia-Pacific region at all. So, I would say that if they don’t want 
Japan or China, they don’t want South Korea.” This was not 
necessarily contradicted by Interviewee 5, but they furthered the 
claim by saying, “I don’t necessarily think they would be 
disinterested in South Korea if they weren’t interested in Japan or 
China, but I definitely think the KAFTA would have come later. Much, 
much later.” 
From the deep interview analysis conducted for this 
dissertation, it is interesting to note two things. Firstly, through the 
data collection from survey analysis presented in the figures above, 
it can be seen that the general consensus is that Australian sentiment 
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shows Japan and China were on Australia’s radar for forming an FTA 
directly after South Korea. This was shown through the data 
collected from the surveys, and secondly in the hypothetical 
questions posed and answers received in the interviews. This brings 
forward the question that leads to the first hypothesis central to the 
discussion made by this dissertation: if Japan and China are of more 
strategic importance to Australia than South Korea, why was the 
KAFTA easier to negotiate, and ratified and implemented before the 
JAEPA and the ChAFTA? 
 To answer this question, this paper develops further on 
Mansfield and Milner’s theory that countries have domestic political 
motivations for forming free trade agreements to suggest that the 
KAFTA was used as a catalyst for forming the JAEPA and ChAFTA 
in order for the Australian government at the time to negotiate as 
many free trade agreements as possible in a short amount of time for 
maximum domestic political benefit.  
This section thus far has aimed to provide a basis for proving 
that Australia’s motivations for forming the KAFTA was to provide a 
catalyst for Japan and China to finalise negotiations and agree to 
ratify and implement the JAEPA and ChAFTA. This can be seen in 
the similarities of the end of negotiations and implementation dates 
of the KAFTA, the JAEPA and the ChAFTA despite the considerably 
longer negotiation period and number of negotiation sessions of the 
JAEPA and the ChAFTA compared to the KAFTA. This sentiment is 
furthered in the interview analysis, where interviewees agreed that 
Australia was not only more interested in forming an FTA with Japan 
and China than South Korea, they further agreed that Australia had 
significant strategic motivations for creating a catalyst to help form 
an FTA with Japan and China, of which the FTA with South Korea 
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played a part. 
If the necessary funding needed to accurately analyse this 
section were to be obtained, interviews would be included from 
Andrew Robb, along with Tony Abbott and any other influential 
Australian politicians during the time the KAFTA, JAEPA and 
ChAFTA were being negotiated. It would also be ideal to interview 
the leaders of the opposition team at the time in order to represent 
the “veto powers”, as is mentioned by Mansfield and Milner.  
A more in-depth analysis of the media coverage at the time 
would be further conducted, searching for the connections between 
keywords such as “Andrew Robb”, “Tony Abbott”, “Liberal National 
Coalition”, “Korea Australia Free Trade Agreement”, “KAFTA”, 
“Japan Australia Economic Partnership Agreement”, “JAEPA”, “China 
Australia Free Trade Agreement”, and “ChAFTA”. The connection of 
these words in search results and the media during the timeframe of 
2013 until present 2019 would also be compared and whether there 
is any correlation in an increase in these keywords with the 
ratification of the KAFTA, the JAEPA, the ChAFTA, as well as the 





The goal of this paper was to explain the disparities in the data when 
one examines the Korea Australia Free Trade Agreement, and the 
supposed economic motivations behind forming this agreement. The 
examples of the Korea Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA), 
and the subsequent Japan Australia Economic Partnership Agreement 
(JAEPA) and China Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA) were 
used to bolster Mansfield and Milner’s theory that countries enter 
into free trade agreements for domestic political benefits. This 
dissertation argued that due to the ease of negotiations of the 
KAFTA, it was then used as a catalyst for the JAEPA and the 
ChAFTA to bolster the reputation of the former Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott, the former Minister for Trade and Investment Andrew Robb, 
and their respective party the Liberal National Coalition (LNP).  
 This dissertation firstly conducted extensive research on 
FTA and KAFTA literature and found there to be a lack of research 
on the topic. There was a plethora of information on the economic 
negotiations behind forming FTAs, but nothing beyond Mansfield and 
Milner’s work, along with other brief mentions of motivations behind 
negotiating international agreements. With regards to the KAFTA, 
the literature was likewise focused primarily on trade analysis or the 
analysis of economic effects of the KAFTA and there was no 
empirical analysis on the reasons behind why the KAFTA was 
formed beyond this. This called for further research on the topic and 
was the initial inspiration for this dissertation. 
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 To further consolidate the hypothesis of this thesis that 
Australia was focused on forming free trade agreements with South 
Korea, Japan and China, a survey was conducted and distributed to 
industry professionals and a portion of the analysis presented in this 
dissertation consolidates this concept. This data was then compared 
to the timelines of the KAFTA, JAEPA and ChAFTA, and the 
disparity in their negotiation and implementation dates was 
highlighted. The subsequent research questions were asked: if Japan 
and China are of more important to Australia than South Korea, why 
was the KAFTA formed before the JAEPA and the ChAFTA? 
 To further the reasoning behind the asking of this question, 
this dissertation analysed the economic impact of the KAFTA, JAEPA 
and ChAFTA to Australia respectively. It found that there was a 
negative economic impact on bilateral trade directly after each FTA 
was formed, which goes against each FTAs publicised reasons for 
negotiation and implementation: economic motivations. This lends to 
Mansfield and Milner’s argument discussed in the latter parts of the 
dissertation that countries have domestic political motivations for 
forming free trade agreements. These include the motivation to 
prove political stability through encouraging free trade in order for 
the party in power to be re-elected due to improved public sentiment. 
 From this theory and the disparities between the predicted 
economic benefits of the KAFTA and the economic data provided, 
this dissertation further theorised that the KAFTA was used as a 
catalyst to form the JAEPA and the ChAFTA in order to ratify and 
implement as many free trade agreements as possible in a short time 
frame before domestic Australian elections. To consolidate this 
theorisation, deep interview analysis was conducted on industry 
professionals and is presented in the latter sections of this paper. 
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These interviews were consolidated with further referencing to 
Mansfield and Milner’s arguments, along with references to 
Australian media regarding the topic. The findings of these 
interviews is that despite interviewees attempting to be diplomatic in 
their assessment of the issue, after being presented with the KAFTA 
timeline facts in comparison to the JAEPA and the ChAFTA, 
discussion and sentiment turned to supporting the concept of catalyst 
motivations for domestic political benefit. When further presented 
with hypothetical scenarios of no JAEPA or ChAFTA, the importance 
of the KAFTA decreased significantly. 
 In conclusion, the goal of this paper was to explain why the 
KAFTA was formed before and negotiated with much more ease than 
the JAEPA and the ChAFTA despite Japan and China’s more 
significant importance to Australia than South Korea. To answer this 
oddity, this dissertation took from the theories presented by 
Mansfield and Milner to theorise that other than transparent 
economic motivations to enter into an FTA, there are potential 
domestic political motivations for forming FTAs. Whilst this is not 
discussed in the literature, it can be seen in the unique case of the 
KAFTA when compared to the JAEPA and the ChAFTA. The reason 
this paper was written was to not only add to the literature 
surrounding the understanding of the motivations behind forming 
Free Trade Agreements, it was to add to the lacking literature on 
South Korea-Australia relations and Australian international relations 
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본 논문은 한국-호주 자유 무역 협정(KAFTA, Korea Australia Free 
Trade Agreement)의 체결 동기를 연구하는 것이다. 한국-호주 자유 무
역 협정(KAFTA)은 당시 가장 강력하고 보완적인 경제 협정 중 하나로 
받아들여지는 반면에 협상 구성에 대해서는 호주와 한국의 동기를 검토
할 때 몇 가지 예외가 있다. 지금까지 FTA는 두 가지 폭 넓은 진실한 
동기에서 비롯된 것으로 이해되었다. 첫번째는 경제적 이익을 위한 무역 
자유화를 진전시키고자 하는 욕구다. 두번째는 자원 및 영토 보안을 개
선하기 위해 FTA를 사용하는 것이다. 이 논문은 에드워드 맨스필드 
(Edward Mansfield)와 헬렌 밀너 (Helen Milner)의 합리적인 주장을 뒷
받침하기 위해 한국-호주 자유 무역 협정(KAFTA)를 활용하고자 한다. 
이 주장은 민주적 지도자들이 국내 정치 이득을 위한 무역 협정의 형성
을 사용한다는 주장이다. 
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협정 (JAEPA); 중국-호주 자유 무역 협정 (ChAFTA); 촉매  
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